Indonesia is the country with the more of Muslims in the world which means 87 per cent of 180 million habitants. Nevertheless, the major part of the declared Muslims mix their faith in Allah with animistic or Hindu-Buddhist beliefs. These are reminiscences of the Indian colonization that would be interrupted with the penetration of Islam in the 16th century, generally superficial and incomplete.
Due to the insular configuration, composed by 13 677 islands, 3 000 inhabited, and with an approximate extension of 1/8 the perimeter of Earth, Indonesia faces problems of national unity. Being the fifth most populous nation, 2/3 are concentrated in only the fifth larger island, Java, where the density is one of the highest. The solution passes inevitably by birth control and transmigration to territories such as Papua New Guinea, recently East Timor but also in between with the evident purpose of dissolving local cultures in the predominant Javanese which is only one amongst 360 tribal and ethno-linguistic groups and more than 250 different languages and dialects.
The Dutch colonial domain had been massively based in Java, with the rest of the archipelago had developed very unequally. From the rigid Islamic areas of North Sumatra to the tribes of Borneo or the Christian islands of the east, a variety of economic and social systems experienced very distinct problems fortheir progress.
At the time of Indonesia's proclamation of independence in 1945, President Sukarno defined an ideological base for the state -- the "Panca sila" (meaning "five virtues") -- to be followed by all citizens and sworn by the social organizations. Main principles imposed were the adoption of Indonesian "Bahasa" language and the acceptance of one among five religions -- Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism -- forbidding the animist cults and other traditional practices. Thus "Panca sila" was assumed as an instrument of governmental control and a mean to javanize the diverse cultures.
But not without much internal opposition. Illuded with the possibility of the creation of an official Islamic state, when Suharto reached to power, Communist administrators and Islamic movements supported the Revolution, but what they didn't expect was the minor concessions offered, and once annihilated the Communist Party, an <<important preoccupation of the government has been to control, domesticate or destroy the most orthodox and active Muslim factions>> (Prof. A. Barbedo de Magalhães, Oporto University).Since then they oftenly erupt in riots against the military aristocracy, basically syncretic in matter of religion.
Besides reaffirming the "Panca sila", in 1982 Suharto introduced the Law of the Associations which would fasten the strain on political, religious and social associations as it increased the powers of the administration to dismiss or impute directors to the aggregations, to destroy or agglutinate them in others more vast and controlled by the militaries.
Social and Political instability is patent in public insurrections in favor of democracy, which in September of 1984 culminated with the killing of 60 Muslims and imprisonment of important personalities such as of former governors that defied an inquiry to the incident.
Neo-colonialism in Indonesia?
Many authors mention that Sukarno had a dream: the formation of a great Indonesia comprising the totality of the ancient Dutch East Indies, inclusive the non-Indonesian population. For this reason had he renounced to the federate structures initially conceived for the creation ofthe United States of Indonesia -- thus betraying the agreement with the Dutch for the transfer of sovereignty --, in favor of an unitary constitution, although still provisional. The new direction was taken in August of 1950, three months after an unilateral declaration of independence by the South Moluccas.
The first elections, free and democratic in fact, would be held in 1955, but disputed by more or less 170 parties! Their differences naturally brought difficulties to the functioning of the parliamentary democracy. On one hand, between the exponents of pre-Islamic syncretism of the "Nahdatul Ulama" (NU)and the orthodox Moslems of the "Masyumi", which's vital strength came from theoutside -- West Sumatra and North Celebes besides Occidental Java (Sundaneseethnic origin). On the other hand, between the Nationalist Party (PNI) and the Communist Party (PKI), based in Java, and these with the Moslems.
The inefficiency of the administration, which passed through seven governments since 1949 to '57, and the rivalry engaged by the parties alone, in contrast with the heroism of the Revolution of August 17th, after all, the concentration of decision and power in Java as restrictor of the economic, social and cultural development aroused at the end tension in the exterior islands.
In February of 1957, Sukarno criticized the Western liberal democracy because unadapted to Indonesian particularity. He interfered more in the constitutional processes and appeals to his concept of "Guided Democracy", founded onindigenous procedures: the important questions should be decided throughprolonged deliberations ("musyawarah") in order to obtain consensus("mukafat"). This was the practice in the village and the same model ought tobe adopted for the nation. Sukarno proposed a government formed by the fourmain parties and a national council represented by parties and functional groups in which, under the guidance of the president (himself), consensus would express itself.
In spite of the charisma gained by Sukarno as father of the country and mentor of the principle "unity in diversity", he was unable to avoid the proclamations of the martial law in March of 1957 as a response to the regional dissidences which reached their peak.
At the end of the year a further set-back was brought by the defeat of a motion for the renewal of negotiations concerning the destiny of West New Guinea. Ina series of direct actions across the country, Dutch property was seized with the Indonesian government taking over. In the beginning of 1958 West Sumatra claimed for the constitution of a new central government under the leadership of Hatta, a moderate and historic figure of the Revolution, from the start vice-president of Sukarno up until two years ago when he resigned because disagreeing with his policy. Ignored the appeal of the Sumatrese a new revolutionary government was formed, supported by leaders of the Masyumi Party, including the ex-Prime Ministers Natsir (September 1950 -- March '51) and Harahap (August '55 -- March '56). The military commandant of the North Celebes joined the initiative, yet most striking was CIA's assistance with armament including aircrafts.
Suppression of the revolt was nevertheless soon accomplished, and with the regions undermined, the parties discredited and the prestige of the victorious army elevated, Sukarno resumed the idea of Guided Democracy in partnership with the military. Meanwhile, the army chief of staff A. Nasution had committed himself to the thought that the return to the revolutionary constitution of 1945 (presidential-type) would offer the best means for implementing the principles of deliberation, consensus and functional representation. Sukarno urged this course in a speech to the Constituent Assembly, elected in 1955 to draft a permanent constitution. Despite failing the approval of the necessary two-thirds for majority, he introduced it through a presidential decree of dubious legality.
Indonesia's domestic as well as foreign diplomacy is difficult to conceive in terms other than in the context of neo-colonialism. It certainly is incompatible with the spirit of the Afro-Asian Conference of Bandung held in Java, in 1955. Among twenty nine countries consensus was reached in order to condemn colonialism <<in all it's forms of manifestation>> . As it seems, imperialism isn't condemnable so long the territories comes from anancient colony. Like the annexation of the Moluccan islands (1950-52) and in1969 the also former Dutch West New Guinea, long pretended. The last was integrated after an Act of Free Choice sanctioned by UN. In truth, many journalists and observers would consider the process orchestrated but it had already been sealed. Today it is remembered as perhaps the most unfortunat eepisode UN's history.
In both regions, as well as in other islands of the Pacific, population claim Melanesian ancestrality, not identifying themselves with Indonesia, predominantly Malaysian.
The country has always been tormented by regional rebellions. From the perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalist movements, even in Java (where in the district of Acheh, a Moslem state practically subsisted between 1948 and 1962),Sumatra and Celebes as we've seen but also Kalimantan, to those involving Christian groups as in the South Moluccas. Still in 1984 the Movement for the Liberation of Papua erupted in attacks against the main cities of the territory, hoisting their flag in the capital opposite to the Regional Parliament.
The power of Sukarno depended along the years of the preservation of the equilibrium between the army and the Communist Party (PKI). The period assisted to the crescent popularity of the communists due to the consistent protection moved by the President in face of the incursions of the militaries. he opposed to the prohibitions of congresses and editorials, banished political organizations patronized by the military to blacken the PKI, placing some of their militants in political posts. Many analysts think that Sukarno waspreparing the path for the rise of the communists to the power. Others say that his action intended to assure a the permanently threatened equilibrium
The coup of Suharto and the military
On the night of September 30, 1965, a group of subaltern officials based at Halim Air Base attempted a coup d'état to anticipate what they alleged to be the take-over of a pro-Western council of generals. But by following morning the Strategic Reserve of the Army Forces(KOSTRAD), commanded by Suharto, had concluded a successful counter-attack. For specialist Benedict Anderson, of Cornell University, it seems odd that Suharto, who would gather the reins of power into his hands, hadn't been aimed at by the "30th of September Movement" which assassinated six army generals (while a seventh, A. Nasution, escaped).
With propaganda that implicated important nationalist and communist politicians in the first stroke and the estimulation of the widely spread resentment of the pro-Chinese PKI was object of among the Indonesian Islamic groups, the militaries gradually assumed power. Suharto begun to maintain the already wasted and sickened Sukarno in a fictional presidency, as a symbol of nationalunity until by decree emptying his legal authority, in March 11, 1966. The next semester would be fatal for more than half a million Chinese and Indonesian be sides an excess of 200 thousand political prisoners which altogether forme done of the greatest Communist parties of the World. The wave of hysteria was such that they were pointed out and oftenly even executed by their proper neighbour civilians in the villages.
By 1968, Suharto was formally appointed President by the People's Congress.
The formation of the New Order was characterized by a crescent militarization of all the spheres of social life, economy, and by a very centralized political direction based on the military elite of Java.
The same is to say today that practically all important seats of the government, including Justice, national and regional administration, state and private enterprises are occupied by generals or superior officers of the Armed Forces.
The military mastered the creation of an authoritative corporate sate, expurgating and then controlling parties and syndicates.
The continuous remodeling of the political parties by the officers of Suharto secured an internal majority of the militaries. "The Sekber Golkar" (Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups). In theory, it was a nonparty organization representing, like Sukarno's functional groups idea of 1957, the groupings ofwhich the nation was really composed: peasants, fisherman, publicfunctionaries, co-operative societies, religious groups, students, ArmedForces, veterans, intellectuals, etc. However in practice, Golkar was agovernment party which's sweeping electoral success owed is much owed since then to the pressure brought to bear on voters by governmental agencies. With victory came more drastic action against the political parties in the form of aforced rationalization, so that in the end only two parties were allowed. In1973, the four Muslim parties (Parmusi, NU, PSII, and Perti) were amalgamatedto form the Party of Unity and Development, while the five non-Muslim (PNI,Parkindo, Katolik, IPKI, and Murba) were joined to form the Indonesian Democratic and Development Party. In the last two decades the regime has strained the margin of expression even more as a consequence of the Law of Associations.
Related records in East Timor
The process of elections held in East Timor hasalways been undoubtedly manipulated for the simple fact that the results havealways expressed the contrary of the majority of the Timorese's intentions ofvotes. And it's liable to think that similar happens here and there across Indonesia
In East Timor results are used by the government officials as indicators of the support level of the integration.
Taylor describes the examples of the 1982 and 1987 elections. In the first general elections held in 1982, says he, not having the three parties any rootsin East Timor in the first place, only Golkar was allowed to make campaign. Before the voting, Indonesian soldiers compelled the Timorese to vote in the governmental party. The presence of the other parties was a mere formality. Finally, the placing of votes was controlled (the curtains only covered to theknees. That however without success for it was possible for many people tosimply bend over and choose another urn...) The number of votes was higher thanthe possible voters, and although the distance and difficulty of the terrain, East Timor was the first to report results. Golkar won with 99,5%. Five years later, results and discrepancy of the figures were similar. In some areas, acalculated 300% of voters were accounted.
A. Barbedo de Magalhães estimates that 70% of Indonesia's economy is inthe hands of the military. Also economically, Suharto has built a centralized system of control. His family fortune is considered by foreign press superior(2 to 3 billion dollars during the 80's) to that of ex-president of PhilippinesRamos Marcos. Taylor points out that strategic industries in areas like petrol,gas, communications and plantations are run by state companies controlled bymen loyal to the President. Aside these enterprises and linked to them, aseries of private companies are propriety of Suharto's family either of closeassociates.
Also in that matter East Timor was victimized. Taylor reports that shortlyafter the invasion, the famous coffee production fell in the hands of threegenerals (Benjamin Murdani, Dading Kalbuadi and Sahala Rajagukguk) decisive forthe occupation. They created the P. T. Denok Hernandes International, which monopolized the business buying at very low prices the coffee cultivated by the Timorese of re-lodgment camps. Transport and sale were also at their care, and all the operation under strict supervision of the militaries. But the Denokshould be only the first Indonesian enterprise to establish in the territory. The Bakrie Brothers for instance is a society of a son and half-brother of Suharto with a family of Arabian ascendancy (from where the name). Others are the P. T. Nusa Bhakti from the wife of the dictator and the P. T. Lianbau fromhis son-in-law. Basic industries which the Timorese relied upon were sacrificed(and there on imported) in the name of what Taylor refers as <<anegligent search for profit by the mi project>>.
Also the lower ranked of the Army Forces took advantage of a latent corruption,launching local taxes, demanding tolls, and accepting bribes for the liberationof prisoners, to avoid persecutions, and also to provide emigration papers.Some military that contest the occupation even cooperate with the resistance inpassing information, avoiding combat or supplying goods. Barbedo Magalhães mentions as an example the offensive of August 16, 1983 that followed the cease-fire: the plan (of Benjamin Murdani) had previously been acknowledged not only by Fretilin but also by various solidarity groups in theoutside.
Internal divisions. For Suharto, who's long exercise in power isparticularly associated to a skillful play to maintain rivalry between twoleading factions of the Armed Forces, the decision to invade of East Timor represented a dilemma. On one hand side, the radical nucleus known as the "falcons" who's spokesman at the time was Ali Moertopo, head of the special operations branch (OPSUS) and who had idealized the most successful operationsof Suharto (the fall of Sukarno, manipulation of parties and incorporation ofWest New Guinea); Yoga Sugama from BAKIN (the military co-ordinating agency ofthe secret intelligence INTEL); Sudomo, chief of the Kopkamtib which was the security organization established to restore law and order in the wake of thecoup of 1965 notablized by the purge of the Communists, and remaining as arm ofthe government. Finally, Benjamin Murdani, with the closest contacts with CIA.Together with their officers, they were after all the godfathers of the NewOrder, and would also be the architects of the invasion.
Moderated by the responsibility to make the final decision, like Suhartohimself, the so called "pigeons" were represented first by the minister ofForeign Affairs (and next vice president) Adam Malik, a civilian that survivedthe coup as member of the government, and then by minister of Defence Mohammed Jusuf, who was the promoter of the cease-fire negotiations of 1983. The episode of his differences with Murdani demonstrates the influence of the "falcons" :the replacement of the first by the last is due to the pressure of the generals interested in the continuation of the war in East Timor, and is inevitably related to the recommence of hostilities against the resistance.
In 1990, three years before the general elections, Taylor wrote that<<for a crescent number of influent military and political groups inIndonesia, the domain of Suharto is turning increasingly unrecommendable. Thetreatment of the economy by his followers and their involvement in a generalized corruption, summed with the unsuccess of his government to modernize an Indonesia reach in resources at a growth rate similar to that of neighbors such as Thailand and Malaysia during the 80's, left militaries torequest for changes in the political system and, implicitly, the retirement of the President>>.
As is known, Suharto would be re-elected in 1993, and perhaps the second most important event was the discharge of Benjamin Murdani, for some years with increasing power, right behind Suharto, an regarded by some analysts as a potential candidate to the presidency.
